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SUPREME COURT OF

UTA!~

STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
ORVILLE RALPH COATES and
DONNA COATES, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
-vsAMERICAN ECONOMY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant and
Appellant.

* * *

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

* * *

Case No. 17026

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

* * * * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiffs seek survivor
benefits, funeral expenses and medical expenses under the
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement provided in an automobile insurance contract between the plaintiffs and the
defendant.

-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The trial court in the First District court of Box
Elder County granted the plaintiff's aotion for summary
Judgment against the defendant for survivor benefits, funeral
expenses and medical costs.

The trial court held that

under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act it is not
necessary for the injured person to be occupying a motor
vehicle as defined in the No-Fault Act but concluded that
where at least one of the vehicles involved in an accident
is a motor vehicle as defined in the Act, the injuries were
covered by the insurance required under the

~10-Fault

Act.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff-Respondent seeks an affirmation of the trial
court's ruling that the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance
Act, Section 31-41-1 et seq.,

u.c.A.

(1953 as amended), as

applied to the particular facts of this case requires
insurance coverage and benefits for these plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs also request that the case be remanded to the
trial court for an additional award of attorney fees incurred
on appeal.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs-Respondents accept the facts as set forth
in the Appellant's Brief, for the reason that the facts
were stipulated to by the parties.

AR GU ME UT

POINT I

THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS
EVIDENCED A CLEAR INTENT THAT IN THIS TYP~
OF ACCIDENT THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE NO-FAULT
INSURANCE ACT §31-41-1 ET SEQ, U.C.A. (1953
AS AMENDED) SHOULD APPLY.
In Originally enacting the "Utah Automobile No-Fault
Act, Utah Code Anno. §31-41-1 et seq. (1953 as aQended)
the State Legislature set forth as the primary purpose
of this legislation the following:
"The purpose of this act is to require
the payment of certain prescribed benefits
in respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other
approved security but on the basis of
no fault, preserving, however, the right
of an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the most serious
types of injuries occur." Utah Code 2\nno.
§ 31-41-2 (1953 as amended) .
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The act next sets forth certain definitions of terms
(see §31-41-3 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)).

The act then

requires evP.ry owner of a motor vehicle to provide either
insurance or some other approved security as defined by
the act or as approved by the Utah insurance department.
(See §31-41-4 and §31-41-5 U.C.A. (1953 as amended)).
Utah Code Anno. §31-41-6 (1953 as amended) then provides:
"-(1) Every insurance policy or other
security complying with the requirements
of subsection (1) of section 31-41-5 shall
provide personal injury protection providing
for payments to the insured and to all other
persons suffering personal injury arising
out of an accident involvin an motor
vehicle.
emphasis added

The legislature next determined the types of recipients
covered under the Act.

In U.C.A. $31-41-7 the act provides:

"(l) The coverages described in section
31-41-6 shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the
insured when injured in an accident in
this state involvin
motor vehicle.
(b) Persona 1n)ur1es arising out o
automobile accidents occurring in this
state sustained by any other natural person
while occupying the described motor vehicle
with the consent of the insured or while a
pedestrian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle.
(emphasis added)
Thus in reading nll of this legislation. together there
aro two classes or categories of people who are covered by
the No-Fault

~ct.
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First, there is the insured (which is a defined term
meaning the naMed insured ... or other relative who reside(s)
in the same household (see

u.c.A.

S31-41 -3(4)) who is

injured in an accident in this state involving any motor
vehicle.
Second, are those injured people such as passengers
occupying the described motor vehicle with the consent
of the insured, or pedestrians if injured in an accident
involving the described motor vehicle.
~s

will be shown later, the recognition of these

separata categories of people entitled to no-fault benefits
sssists in understanding why the 1975 amendment to the
No-Fault

~ct

does not disqualify the plaintiffs from coverage

under the l\ct.
It is the respondents' position that under U.C.A.
§31-41-6(1) and 31-41-7(1) (a)

(1953 as amended) that the

plaintiffs only need show three (3) elements to be entitled
to their no-fault benefits.
(1) was Brent
( 2)

~alph

These three elements are:

Coates an "eligible insured person";

did Brent Ralph Coates receive "bodily injuries"; and

(3) was nrent Ralph Coates injured in an accident involving

any motor vehicle.

-5-
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Since the stipulated facts agree that Brent Ralph Coates
was an "eligible insured person" and Brent Ralph Coates did
receive "bodily injuries", the only question before this
court is whether or not his injuries were caused by an
accident involving any motor vehicle.
"Motor vehicle" is a defined term pursuant to the
insurance contract and pursuant to Utah State law.

The

statute defines motor vehicle as "any vehicle of a kind
required to be registered under Title 41, but excluding,
however, motorcycles.
Assuming that the motorcycle

.~1r.

Coates was operatinq

(even though not owned by him) would be excluded from
coverage, the fact remains that Mr. Coates was injured in
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle, that motor
vehicle being the motor vehicle operated by Ferris Reeder.
This point was clearly understood by the trial court
who noted that this accident involved two vehicles.

While

it is clear that the Coates' youth was occupying and riding

upon a motorcycle, the defendant-appellant fails to understand that Ferris Reeder was operating a motor vehicle,
and his motor vehicle is not excluded, and his motor vehicle
caused the accident and injuries.

Thus, under §31-41-6(1)

-6-
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and §31-41-7(1) (a) the plaintiffs-respondents are entitled
to coverage under their own policy because:
"Personal injuries [were] sustained by an
insured when injured in an accident in
this State involving any motor vehicle.
The appellants argue that the 1975 Legislature clearly
intended to deny any no-fault benefits to motorcycle occupants in enacting an amendment to the No-Fault Act.

However,

neither the language of the amendment nor the debate surrounding the enactment of the amendment suggests such a
result was desired, let alone achieved.
Prior to 1975 the term "pedestrian" meant:
"any natural person not occupying or
riding upon a motor vehicle."
All the 1975 amendment did was to add the following
language to the definition of a pedestrian:
"excluding, however, any natural person
occupying or riding upon a motorcycle."
Thus as previously pointed out of the two categories
of people entitled to benefits ("the insured person and.
his covered relatives injured in an accident involving
any motor vehicle" and "non-insured occupants or pedestrians
injured in an accident involving the insured motor vehicle")
the amendment merely dealt with defining "pedestrians"
injured in an accident involving an insured motor vehicle.

-7-
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The reasons for this amendment were well articulated
by the witnesses, senators and representatives who participated in the debate.
The people who testified talked of the inequality of
allowing a motorcycle operator who did not choose to purchase
no-fault or medical payment provisions on his motorcycle
to then be able to collect no-fault benefits on the policy
of a motor vehicle owner whose vehicle was involved in an
accident with a motorcycle.
Senator Wilford Black [D] Salt Lake County, sponsored
Senate Bill 45, the proposed amendment, and stated that
the reason for the amendment was to prevent a motorcycle
operator who wasn't insured from having a "free ride"
on the insurance policy of an automobile driver who had
no-fault and whose vehicle was involved in an accident.
Mr. Melvin Summerhays of the Utah State Insurance
Commissioners Office testified on February 4, 1975 before
the State Senate on Senate Bill 45 and again stated that
the purpose of the bill was to prevent motorcycle operators
who were not insured from collecting as "pedestrians" on
an automobile owners policy.

Mr. Summerhays stated:

"Now what we didn't anticipate and I'm
sure the legislature didn't anticipate
that we were making the motorcyclist the

-8-
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same as a pedestrian and in making him a
pedestrian, we gave him something for
nothing ..• In other words, if he was in an
accident with your vehicle now, if he was
at fault or otherwise, he can run in to
your car when you're sitting still and he
has the benefits of your No-Fault Policy
as a pedestrian ..• so that the real intent
of this amendment we are talking about is
to take the motorcyclist out of the pedestrian classification ..• "
Following several questions, Mr. Summerhays again
reiterated that the purpose of the amendment was to exclude
motorcyclists from the definition of pedestrian.
No one spoke in favor of nor did anyone mention that
§31-41-7(1) (a) which provides benefits when a policy holder
or his immediate relatives who are covered by his policy
are involved in an accident involving any motor vehicle
should be denied coverage under this amendment.
Mr. Carl Halbert and Mr. Keith McCune, insurance
representatives, also spoke regarding the amendment.
Again they stated.that their sole purpose in urging the
passage was to keep a motorcyclist who does not elect to
insure himself under no-fault or under a medical payment
policy from getting free coverage as a pedestrian under an
automobile owners policy.

They both testified that if a

motorcyclist chose to do so, he could voluntarily buy a
medical benefits and disability benefits policy.

-9-
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In concluding the debate, Senator Black reiterated
the reasons for his sponsorship of the Amendment and
claimed that the present situation allowing motorcyclists
"who are not paying a dollars worth of insurance towards
personal injury protection" to claim benefits as pedestrians
was highly unfair and that the Amendment should be adopted.
The Senate subsequently adopted the proposed Amendment.
The proposed .7-\.rnendment was next considered by the
Utah House of Representatives wherein it was debated on
February 12, 1975.

Representative James Hansen, (R] Davis

County, was the leading advocate for its passage before
the House.

Representative Hansen explained that all the

bill was doing "was to take the motorcyclist out of the
definition of a pedestrian".
Representative Hansen went on to explain that since
a motorcyclist would not pay any "no-fault" premiums
they should not be entitled to "free" benefits by being
covered as pedestrians under a motor vehicle owner's
policy.

Mr Hansen further stated that if a motorcyclist

desired to do so:
"He can go to an [insurance] company and
he can purchase insurance: liability,
medical, collision, comprehensive - whatever it is he wants to purchase for his
own individual requirements and that is
the reason behind the change in this
no-fault bill."
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Again, no one suggested that the first category of
people as defined in 31-41-7(1) (a) should be denied
coverage.

As to this category of people to-wit those

who purchase no-fault benefits and are injured in an
accident "involving any motor vehicle" the 1975 Amendrl'\ent
left all coverages and benefits intact.
The House passed the Amendment and it

becam~

effective

on !-1ay 13 , 19 7 5 .
If the legislature really intended all motorcyclists
to be "free game" and totally excluded from all no-fault
benefits they could have done so very easily by amending
§31-41-7 (1) (a) to read:
"(l) The coverages described in Section
31-41-6 shall be applicable to:
(a) Personal injuries sustained by
the insured when injured in an accident
in this State involving any Motor vehicle,
[unless the insured is occupying or riding
upon a rrtotorcycle] ."
Since all the legislature did was to change the
definition of a pedestrian it is clear there was no
legislative intent to deny benefits to insured people
who were injured in an accident involving any motor vehicle.

-11-
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POINT II

THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE NO-FAULT
ACT WOULD BE THWARTED IF THIS COURT
DENIES COVERAGE TO THE PLAINTIFFS.

The basic purpose of the Utah Automobile No-Fault
Act is stated as follows:
"The purpose of this act is to require
the payment of certain prescribed benefits in respect to motor vehicle accidents
through either insurance or other approved
security but on the basis of no fault,
preserving, however, the right of an injured
person to pursue the customary tort claims
where the most serious types of injuries
occur."
While it was the intention of the legislature to effectuate
certain savings in automobile insurance rates, it is clear
that the main purpose was to afford insurance coverage for
certain prescribed benefits irregardless of fault.
The plaintiffs and any similarly situated citizens
of this state really have no way to insure against the risk
of injury to their son other than through their own no-fault
policy.
Since their son was only test driving a motorcycle,
there was no way they could have purchased an insurance
policy to cover the risks.

If their son had owned the

motorcycle and had failed to obtain coverage, both tpe
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policy of insurance and the state statutes would have
excluded coverage on a motor vehicle owned but not insured.
(See U.C.A. §31-41-10 (1953 as amended)}. Thus the only way
to insure that medical payments and other benefits would be
available would be to rule that the provisions of the act
apply under this factual situation.
The appellants would apparently concede that had
the plaintiff's son been injured in an accident involving
Mr. Reeder's vehicle they would pay except for the fact
he was on a motorcycle.

Thus had 3rent Coates been riding

on a bicycle, unicycle, skate board, horse, donkey or
elephant or any other means except a motorcycle he would
have had protection.

The appellants urge that though

the plaintiffs purchased a no-fault policy as required
by law and even though their son was injured and died in
an accident involving a motor vehicle, just because he was
on a motorcycle no benefits are available.
It is suggested that such a result is contrary to
the purpose behind this

~ct.

The respondents, also, claim that a denial of coverage
would vitiate the contractual agreement between plaintiffs
and defendants.

-13-
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The insurance policy in effect provided:
"The Company agrees with the named insured,
subject to all of the provisions in this
endorsement and to all of the provisions
of the policy except as modified herein,
as follows:
SECTION 1
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE
The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of each
eligible injured person for:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

medical expenses,
work loss,
funeral expenses, and
survivor loss

with respect to bodily injury sustained
by an eliiible injured person caused by an
accident involvin the use of a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle."
emphasis a ded
see
R.38 for copy of the insurance policy.)
Thus as previously pointed out, if the plaintiffs can
show three· (3) elements, they are entitled to insurance
coverage.

These three elements are:

(1) was Brent Ralph

Coates an "eligible insured person"1 (2) did Brent Ralph
Coates receive "bodily injuries"1 and (3) was Brent Ralph
Coates injured in an accident involving the use of a motor
vehicle as a motor vehicle.
since he was an "eligible insured person" and he
received "bodily injuries" and he was injured in an accident
I

involving a motor vehicle (the Reeder vehicle), the plaintiffs
are entitled to coverage under their own policy.
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If it could be considered that the insurance policy
is unclear as to whether the basic benefits should apply,
it is pointed out that Utah law clearly provides that
automobile insurance policies must be construed to resolve
doubts or uncertainties against the insurer which prepared
and issued the policy.

See Commercial Credit Corp. v.

Premier Insurance Co. 12 Utah 2d 321, 366 P2d 476 (1961);
see, also, American Cas. Co. of Redding Pa. v. Sta.r Ins. Co.
Ltd. 568 P2d 731 (Utah 1977) •
Thus, even if there existed an uncertainty as to
whether a rider of a motorcycle hit by another Motor vehicle
would be covered, all uncertainties would have to be resolved
in favor of the insured.

POINT III
IDHE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED CASES
FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS IN INTERPRETING
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH AUTOMOBILE
NO-FAULT INSURANCE ACT.

Cases involving factual circumstances similar to the
present case have been decided in a number of foreign
jurisdictions.

The vast majority of courts considering

this question have ruled that no-fault benefits were payable
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to the injured party occupying a motorcycle.
The defendant cites the case of Speakman v State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 402 Atlantic 2d 123
(Md.1979) as purported authority for denial of coverage.
That case has two major differences from the case
before this court.

In the Speakman case the injured party

was operating his 2!!!! motorcycle.

As an owner, he could

insure his own vehicle if he had so desired, and thus
prot.ected himsel·f from the risk of injury.
Mr. Brent Coates did not 2!!!!. the motorcycle he
was riding.

He inspected the motorcycle at Vesco's Sport

Center and apparently requested to take it for a test drive.
After traveling approximately 11 blocks northbound on Main
Street, he was struck by the Ferris Reeder vehicle and
killed.

Thus, Mr. Brent Coates had no opportunity to insure

himself other than the general coverage of his parent's
policy.
Had the Speakman case occurred in Utah under the same
facts as it did in Maryland and if the owner was insured by
the same policy as the Coates were, the same result should
have been reached in Utah as was reached in Maryland.

This

is due to the first exclusion listed in the Coates policy
which states:

-16-
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Exclusions
This coverage does not apply:
(a)

to bodily injury sustained by any
person while occupying a motor
vehicle which is owned by the named
insured and which is not an insured
motor vehicle." (Emphasis added)

The fact that Brent Ralph Coates was operating a
motorcycle not owned by his parents or himself makes
a great difference.
The second major difference is that the Speakman
case was really a determination of the Statutes of the
State of Maryland.

In fact the court clearly defined

the issue as follows:
"The appellant's automobile insurance policy
included the following proviso with respect
to PIP coverage:
'THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY
UNDER:
(j) COVERAGE P TO ANY PERSON WHO:

.

.

(4) SUSTAINS BODILY INJURY ARISING
OUT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MAINTENANCE
OR USE OF A MOTOR CYCLE OR MINI BIKE;'
The issue is whether under the Maryland
Insurance Cod~, the appellee could
legally make such an exclusion."
The Maryland Court concluded that such an exclusion
was valid for an "owned" motorcycle.

The insurance policy

between the Coates and American Economy Insurance had no
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such exclusion and thus the Speakman case is not really
in point or even authority to support defendant's position.
The defendant-appellant cites the cases of Heglin v
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 366 A. 2d 345 (N. J.
App. 1976) and Harlan v. Fidelity & Casualty Com12any, 353
A.2d 151 (N.J. App.1976).

Both of these cases dealt with

factual circumstances similar to the present case, in both
the court ruled that no-fault benefits were payable.

Appel-

lant attempts to dismiss these cases on the assertion that
they really involve conflicts between the language of the
policy and the language of the applicable statutes.

Appellant

fails to even note the most recent case decided by the
New Jersey Court, that being Gerber v Allstate Insurance
£2..:_ 1 391 A.2d 1285 (N.J. App. 1978).

In that case at page

1287 the court stated the following:
" .•• the fact that the injured insured is
driving a motorcycle at the time of the
accident does not in itself justify the
denial of coverage."
(Heglin and Harlan cases cited)
"From both of the above cases it is apparent
that in order for an insured under an automobile policy to receive PIP benefits, the
accident need only be one involving an automcbile, even thou h the insured himself is
driving a non-qua 1 y ng
Emp asis

added)
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Thus the New Jersey Court on three separate occasions has
consistently held that under facts similar to the present
case, benefits were payable.
The trial court cited the case of Shoemaker v. National
Ben Franklin of Michigan, 259 N.W.2d 414 (Mich. App.1977).
Appellant makes the rash statement that it is beyond
appellant's capacity to understand or explain how the
Shoemaker case supports the trial court's ruling.

The

Shoemaker case involved a plaintiff who was injured
while riding a motorcycle which collided with a farm
tractor on a public highway.

The plaintiff brought suit

to recover no-fault benefits from his automobile insurance
company.

The trial court granted defendant's Motion For

Summary Judgment and the appellate court ruled as follows:
"For an insurer to incur liability under
(the statute) there must at a minimum be
an accident involving a vehicle intended
to be covered by (the statute)."
The clear implication of the Shoemaker ruling is
that if either one of the vehicles involved in the collision
had been a "motor vehicle" as defined by statute, then
benefits would have been recoverable.
Appellant concedes that the later Michigan case of
Piersante v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Company, 278
N.

w.

2d 691 (Mich. App. 1979), substantially supports the

trial court's decision in the present case.

Appeilant
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asserts that the statutory provisions relied upon in the
Piersante case were substantially different from the
Utah Statutes, but appellant makes no effort to demonstrate
the differences.

The Michigan Statute was similar to Utah's

in that it defined "motor vehicle" in such a way as to
exclude motorcycle.

Additionally, the Michigan statute

required payment of benefits for injury arising out of the
use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.

The Michigan

Court stated:
"This provision does not require that the
insured be the driver of the motor vehicle
involved in the accident. It only required
that the injury arise out of the operation
of a motor vehicle ••••
In the present case, plaintiff's injury arose
out of the operation of the motor vehicle
with which he collided. Unlike the situation
in Shoemaker, the vehicle with which he
collided was required to be and ·was insured
under (the statute)."
Based upon this reasoning the court ruled that the
defendant insurer must pay no-fault benefits to the plaintiff.
The trial court's opinion cited the Florida case of
Negron v. The Travelers Insurance Company, 282 S.2d 28 (Fla.
App. 1973).

In its Brief appellant again rashly states

that it is unable to explain how Negron is applicable here.
In Negron· the plaintiff was operating a vehicle (a tractor
trailer owned by the United States Postal Service) not
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defined as a "motor vehicle" by the Florida No-Fault Statute.
Plaintiff's vehicle was involved in a collision with a notor
vehicle.

The Florida Court held that Negron's personal

automobile insurance policy must pay no-fault benefits
to him because the accident involved a "motor vehicle".
"There is no question that under the
statement of facts the plaintiff's injury
was caused by physical contact between a
postal tractor-trailer and a motor vehicle."
The Negron case then, stands for the principal that
only one "motor vehicle" need be involved in the collision
for no-fault coverage to apply.
Finally, appellant cites the Florida case of Long
Island Insurance Company v. Frank, 328 s.2d 542 (Fla. App.
1976) •

That case involved the question of whether or not

the plaintiff might recover personal injury protection
benefits from his own no-fault automobile insurance carrier
as a result of injuries sustained while operating a motorcycle which collided with a motor vehicle.

Appellant is

correct in stating that the Florida Court held in favor
of the insurance company, but appellant fails to advise
this court that the reason for the holding was an interpretation of the Florida Statute.

The applicable Florida

Statute required the insurer of a motor vehicle to pay
personal protection benefits for
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"accidental bodily injury sustained in
this state by the owner while operating
a motor vehicle, or while not an occupant
of a motor vehicle or motorcycle, if the
injury is caused by physical contact with
the motor vehicle."
The court ruled against the plaintiff because he was
clearly occupying a motorcycle at the time of the collision.
Appellant has spent much time talking about legislative intent.
If the Utah Legislature intended to exclude motorcyclists in
all cases, it could have done so by adopting language similar
to the Florida Statute.

The Utah Legislature did not do this,

and appellant stretches the imagination to the breaking point
by asking the court to rule that the Utah Legislature
"intended" the same result as the Florida Statute even
though it did not use that language.

CONCLUSION

The respondents respectfully suggest that the language
of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Act requires payment of
the prescribed benefits for an insured who is injured
in an accident involving any motor vehicle.

The 1975

legislature in amending the definition of pedestrian did
not change that result.
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The basic policy of allowing a person to insure
against the risks of injuries arising out of Motor vehicle
usage would be tlwarted, unless the plaintiffs receive
coverage under this policy.
The decisions of other appellate courts have consistently afforded coverage under the same factual situations
which existed in this case.
It is therefore urged that the trial court's decision
be affirmed and that pursuant to U.C.\. J31-41-8 (1953
as amended) that the case be remanded for a

deter~ination

of attorney fees and interest.
Respectfully submitted this

-25!!_

day of September,

1980.

MANN, HADFIELD AND THORNE

Ben H. !Iadfield
Attorneys for Plaint ff-Respondent
35 First Security Bank Building
P. o. Box "F"
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Mailed two copies, postage prepaid, this

25f1 day of

September, 1980, of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to
Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 32 Exchange Place, 600 Commercial
Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

